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Introduction 
‘People in this country have had enough of experts’. This was the response of a key campaigner 
for ‘Brexit’, Michael Gove, when confronted with a long list of organisations (such as the IMF) 
that were making the economic case for Britain to remain in the EU.  
This is a shocking statement, particularly coming from a highly-educated former Minister of 
Education. As professional economists, we see ourselves as contributing to society precisely 
through our expertise. Yet Gove was picking up on a trend in public discourse, which gained 
further momentum during the US presidential election campaign, of disregarding expert opinion. 
This is not a transitory phenomenon. Empirical evidence of the gulf between expert and lay opinion 
in the US on economic policy has been provided by Sapienza and Zingales (2013), a gulf which 
was not affected when the lay subjects were made aware of expert opinion. But there are now so 
many challenges requiring an informed policy response: domestic political upheavals, geo-
political upheavals, technological upheavals, environmental upheavals, the list goes on. All require 
the application of expertise, so the current challenge to experts-per-se needs to be addressed.  
Out of the discourse on expertise have emerged two sequential characterisations of the zeitgeist. 
The first is that a post-democratic era had come to prevail, whereby decisions were being made on 
the basis of expert opinion rather than any democratic process. This characterisation has 
foundation in institutional arrangements which explicitly put power over policy decisions in the 
hands of experts, such as independent central banks and the European Fiscal Compact (see further 
Pühringer, forthcoming). The democratic deficit has been further compounded by the extent to 
which policy-making institutions have been captured by vested interests (Morgan 2017). Seen in 
this light, the political developments of 2016 can be seen as an attempt to reassert democracy.  
But out of that effort has also arisen what is characterised as a post-truth era, where truth is 
popularly regarded as irrelevant to that democratic process. The online Oxford English Dictionary 
defines post-truth as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’ (Skapinker 
2016). Assertions which ‘feel right’ but have no basis in fact are accepted as valid on the grounds 
that they challenge the elite and their vested interests. Of course this raises the question of what 
truth is, with a potential conflict between the understanding of experts and the understanding of 
the individual voter based on experience. If economic expertise is to contribute to policy debate, 
then the scope for different understandings needs to be addressed. But far from implying that any 
assertion is legitimate, this scope underlines the importance of justification of understanding, by 
reason and experience.  
Where does this leave the economist as expert? Gove (2016) elaborated further on why experts 
were being disregarded: They purport to ‘know what is best and get it consistently wrong’. Here 
we examine the validity of these claims. We focus particularly on forecasting, since that is what is 
popularly perceived to be ‘consistently wrong’. We consider the implications for the methodology 
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and content of economic analysis and the way in which it is presented to policy-makers and to the 
public. This latter enquiry raises issues about the relationship between economic advice and the 
democratic process, issues which extend from the methodology and content of economics to 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Economic Forecasting 
It was a consistent refrain among participants in debates about Britain’s membership of the EU, in 
rejecting opponents’ economic forecasts, that such forecasts are ‘always wrong’. For an economist, 
that is not in itself an effective argument against forecasting, since econometric forecasts are 
always expressed in terms of a confidence interval around a central forecast, so that these forecasts 
can only be expected to be right on average. Of greater concern is disturbing causes which are not 
random, but rather are significant developments assumed away by the forecasting model. Then 
outcomes will be consistently different from the central forecast, as when the government’s 
forecasts of improving public finances failed to materialise, resulting in increased fiscal austerity. 
With such tangible consequences of failed forecasts, the public’s patience wears thin. But the 
failure of mainstream models to forecast the crisis had already primed the public to fundamental 
weaknesses in economic forecasting, engendering distrust of economic experts. 
So is the answer that economists just need to try harder? For most economists, that is the answer. 
Caballero (2010) for example identifies the problem with ‘core’ dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) macroeconomic models which sought quantitative precision without 
adequate real-world understanding. Yet he sees hope in this approach drawing on what he terms 
‘peripheral’ analysis which has a better real-world understanding, but which is primarily verbal. 
‘We need to rework the mechanism the core currently uses to go from insights derived in the 
periphery to quantitative general equilibrium ones’ (Caballero 2010: 98). Indeed much effort has 
been put into making the assumptions of DSGE models more realistic, but the fact remains that 
they are by their nature incapable of predicting a crisis because of the way they are constricted to 
ensure settlement on equilibrium. 
Some economists had predicted the crisis as imminent, though (consistent with Minsky’s, 1982, 
1986, financial instability hypothesis) not the precise trigger or its precise timing. But these 
forecasts were drowned out by the output of the main macroeconomic models used by policy 
makers and by the financial sector. Caballero (2010: 85) dismisses the matter as follows: ‘To be 
honest, this inability to predict does not concern me much. It is almost tautological that severe 
crises are essentially unpredictable, for otherwise they would not cause such a high degree of 
distress.’ This attitude lends support to the view that general equilibrium theorising is satisfactory, 
except with respect to crises, regarded as aberrations. Greenspan (2009) argued that crises cannot 
be predicted and central banks cannot diffuse bubbles anyway. So the best response is simply to 
establish preventative rules (such as capital requirements), but in such a way as to ‘enhance the 
effectiveness of competitive markets, not impede them’.   
But, had they been taken seriously, the crisis predictions would have prepared the authorities, not 
only to develop a more robust regulatory framework (as Minsky had advocated; see Kregel 2014), 
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but also to be alert to the danger signs. That the predictions were not precise is in itself telling. The 
question is whether it is even feasible to expect a macroeconomic model to yield useful precise 
quantitative predictions, in which case efforts to produce a better model are misdirected. As 
Lawson (2009) argues, it is in the nature of economies, as complex, open, evolving systems, to 
evade capture by any one formal mathematical model. Any model requires assumptions, so that 
the onus is on the modeller to examine each context in order to decide whether these assumptions 
are reasonable. The differences of opinion on policy between economic experts and the general 
public identified by the Sapienza and Zingales (2013) study came down to the latter’s greater 
willingness to question assumptions. At best, as Keynes had argued, any formal model can only 
be a partial argument, to be combined with other types of argument, and provisional in the face of 
the particular context of application (Carabelli and Cedrini 2014). More tellingly, Keynes argued 
that models should be aids to thought, not furnished with quantitative values (O’Donnell 1997). 
As partial arguments, models are insufficient for explanation. Any particular context requires a 
theoretical account (of which a model may be one part) which is adapted to reflect the particular 
circumstances and thus which assumptions are reasonable simplifications. When Friedman (1953) 
argued that the goal should be prediction (on the basis of assumptions which might well be false) 
rather than explanation, he caused a furore. The predominant view among the mainstream then 
was that explanation, or at least good description, should instead be the primary goal. But 
Friedman’s position now dominates the mainstream. Of course policy-makers need guidance as to 
what to expect from implementing particular policy measures. By considering the various (at times 
countervailing) forces potentially at work, the expert economist can outline them and express a 
judgement as to their relative strength, justifying this judgement in relation to alternatives. In turn 
judgements about alternative explanations for actual outcomes can be appraised using a wider 
range of mechanisms than simple comparison with a point forecast (Runde 1998).    
The implication is that economists need to adopt a more pluralist methodology, drawing on 
different disciplines as well as different methods, where mathematical models form only a part. 
Otherwise it will not be surprising if point forecasts continue to be wrong, and wrong 
systematically. While GDP forecast errors may be accepted by the general public as detached from 
personal experience, there was widespread public scepticism when forecasts were made of the 
precise drop in incomes, or such things as the increase in cost of continental holidays, immediately 
after a Brexit vote. Indeed the goal of providing point forecasts based on single macroeconomic 
models is itself a major part of the problem.  
A major hurdle is the presumption that economics should aim to be like the physical sciences and 
that quantitative prediction is the hallmark of science. On the one hand this philosophy of science 
has long been discredited and in any case the physical sciences are more complex than the version 
emulated by mainstream economics (Cartwright 1999). On the other hand this view of the 
scientific method has led to mainstream economists ignoring methodological questions 
Drakopoulos (2016). But the result has been on the one hand a focus on formal mathematical 
modelling and on the other a sense of self-confidence in economics as a scientific discipline. 
Mainstream economics has become an increasingly sophisticated technical subject, detached from 
considerations which cannot be fitted into the technical apparatus. Policy implications are typically 
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drawn, but without reference to the complex network of assumptions which underpin the models 
in question.  
Indeed there is a range of alternative approaches to economics on which have been built critiques 
of the mainstream approach and different ideas as to how to proceed such that economists would 
not ‘always be wrong’. But why have these alternatives not been known about, far less taken up, 
by policy makers? The mainstream answer would be that they are less scientific, but alternative 
answers lie in the sociology of the discipline. Non-mainstream economists have long pointed out 
the mechanisms by which non-mainstream research is actively discouraged (through hiring, 
publication and funding). This argument has lately been reinforced by two analyses which are 
influential on account of being produced outside conventional economics academia: the 
sociological analysis of Fourcade et al (2014) and the analysis of millennial students of economics, 
Earl, Moran and Ward-Perkins (2016).    
We have argued here that economic forecasts have often been wrong because of their undue 
reliance on formal mathematical models which could not take account of developments assumed 
away and which were unreasonably focused on equilibrium outcomes. Forecasting could be done 
better, as indeed is the goal of mainstream modellers, but we have questioned the usefulness of the 
very focus on models as being doomed to failure. But this failure was paired with the perceived 
habit of economists to ‘know what is best’. We turn now to examine this claim. 
 
Economics and democracy 
That economists ‘know best’ follows from an understanding of economics as a specialist scientific 
discipline. Specialism in itself is no bad thing. Indeed Smith (1776, I.ii.9; LJ, 347, 470) first talked 
about the division of labour in terms of the development of ideas. But Smith (1759: III.2.20, 
VII.ii.4.14) also argued that, while mathematics and the physical sciences could proceed for long 
without public intervention because their subject matter was remote from personal experience, this 
was not the case for the social sciences. Smith anticipated that public discourse would ensure that 
social sciences remained grounded in experience. Yet, by aspiring to be scientific in the same way 
as the physical sciences and by privileging the mathematical method, economics has managed to 
a considerable extent to promote what Earle et al (2016: 9) call an ‘econocracy’, ‘a society in which 
political goals are defined in terms of their effect on the economy, which is believed to be a distinct 
system with its own logic that requires experts to manage it’. But now that expertise is being 
publicly challenged. 
 
The technical nature of mainstream economics is emphasised by its presentation as being value-
free. To the extent that textbooks discuss such things, economics is presented in terms of positive 
analysis using ‘the scientific method’, with normative judgements left to policy-makers (see e.g. 
Mankiw and Taylor 2006). But the constrained optimisation framework has values embedded in 
it, whether acknowledged or not, such as that workers in a competitive environment are paid the 
value of their marginal product, i.e. what they are worth. The issue of gains from trade loomed 
large in the US presidential debate. Mainstream theory concludes that more trade is always 
beneficial in aggregate, but it does so on the assumption that the DSGE structure remains 
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unchanged, i.e. that there have not been irreversible changes in structures, behaviour and the 
exercise of power. What gained most attention in mainstream analysis was the other assumption, 
that aggregate gains benefit society even if the winners don’t compensate the losers. There is no 
escaping the fact that economics continues to be a moral science. 
Economists therefore have a moral responsibility to be transparent about the value judgements 
embodied in their theories and to be prepared to debate them. This would address any suspicion 
that economists were serving vested interests. But there is a more profound moral responsibility 
which arises from the nature of economic knowledge. Experience has shown that predictive 
success is an inadequate basis for appraising theories, such that different bodies of theory using 
different methodological approaches co-exist (even if most are discouraged by purveyors of the 
mainstream). This is particularly the case for a field whose subject matter is a complex, evolving, 
open system. Knowledge about the economy is uncertain, severely limiting the scope for classical 
logic. Drawing instead on a range of lines of reasoning and types of evidence, what is required of 
the economist is reasonable judgement. As Marcuzzo (2010: 45) points out, reasonableness is a 
moral quality which addresses the collective good rather than the personal benefit sought by 
individual rationality.  
It is therefore immoral, not only to conceal value judgements, but also to present as scientific truth 
a conclusion which is approach-specific. It is incumbent on all economists to be prepared to explain 
their approach and defend it relative to others. Economists, as experts, know better than those who 
do not make an in-depth study of the economy. But no one economist can claim to ‘know best’ 
without imposing her own value judgments on society and without arguing why her approach to 
economic knowledge is better than alternatives.  
For experts to impose value judgments on society is also undemocratic. If economics is thought of 
as a purely technical subject, then the problem does not arise. In fact, with the increasing 
prevalence of viewing economics as a technical subject there has been an increasing tendency to 
set up policy-making structures which separate economic policy from political processes. Central 
bank independence is a case in point, whereby an unelected Governor (usually with an unelected 
committee) make decisions on monetary policy. Yet these decisions can have far-reaching 
consequences, e.g. for income distribution, as has been noted for the policy of quantitative easing 
(ref). Holders of marketable assets have gained hugely from the liquidity injected into asset 
markets, for example, while holders of fixed-income assets have lost out.  
But governments themselves justify unpopular economic policy by referring to supposedly 
independent technical economic expertise. Thus real hardship is caused for society’s poorest when 
austerity measures such as benefit cuts are justified by the need to reduce the fiscal deficit to a 
level which is acceptable to the economic experts who drive market sentiment (Dow 2014). 
Economic decisions are presented as separable from politics. But, as those who have for long 
advocated a political economy approach, the public have come to perceive the interaction between 
politics and economics. But since all that is perceived by the public is economic experts who deny 
any connection, rather than the hidden army of political economists, it is not surprising that this 
concealment is identified with vested interests. But to argue for a political economy approach is 
not to argue that there is no effective expertise, that economics is ‘just’ politics by another name. 
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Rather it is to argue that economies are not separable, but are social, political, technological 
systems which require expertise of different kinds which can interact in order to build up reliable 
knowledge in spite of intrinsic uncertainty. 
The institutional arrangements which privileged economic expertise in the post-democratic era 
were justified by the view of the economic expert as technician, operating independently of politics 
or ethics. What has been argued here is that economic analysis inevitably involves ethical 
judgments, whether made explicit or not. Ethical judgements enter even more into policy 
discourse. It therefore serves the democratic purpose for economists involved in the policy process 
to discuss these judgements explicitly, as exemplified by Haldane’s exploration of distributional 
questions (see e.g. Haldane 2016). 
  
Conclusion 
The charge that economic forecasts are often wrong while economists claim to know best becomes 
understandable when we consider how economics is (mis)represented to the public as a technical 
subject which can operate separately from politics and moral judgements. But if economists are 
honest about the limitations of any one analysis and about embedded moral judgements then they 
would show that they only know better in the sense of having expertise. An understanding of 
economics as a separable technical subject became embedded in various institutional arrangements 
which gave economists significant power over policy decisions. A recognition instead that 
economics is more complex, subject to uncertainty and interrelated with other disciplines, needs 
to be reflected in institutional arrangements such that policy decisions are not on ‘purely’ economic 
grounds alone. 
This is all more challenging than formal mathematical modelling (technically challenging though 
that be). But by living up to its social responsibilities, economic expertise would again command 
more public respect. Further, better public engagement is required. Earle et al (2016: ch. 6) propose 
a policy of promoting broad democracy by cultivating an ‘economic citizenry’ with a view to 
making economics ‘a discipline which is open to public scrutiny and engages the public in a 
substantive, two-way dialogue’ (Earle et al 2106: 129). Similar exercises have emerged naturally 
in Scotland from the grass-roots movements arising from the 2014 Scottish referendum on 
independence. In contrast to the EU referendum debate, the Scottish experience was of an 
energised polity with if anything an enhanced reputation of economic experts. There is no inherent 
difference between the academic and the lay-economist. As Smith (1776: I.ii.4) put it, ‘[t]he 
difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street 
porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education’. 
So what is required of the economist as expert? The implication of what has been argued here is 
that a different form of expertise is required than technical skills alone, and this has strong 
implications for the education of economists. We have already referred to Keynes’s theory of 
knowledge and his understanding of economics as a moral science. We end with his tribute to 
Alfred Marshall, which listed the attributes of a ‘master-economist’. Few can achieve such a 
position, but here Keynes sets out what should be our aspiration: 
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‘[T]he master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must be 
mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher—in some degree. He must understand 
symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in terms of the general 
and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the present in 
the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions 
must lie entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a 
simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near to earth 
as a politician’ (Keynes 1924: 321-322). 
 
 
References 
Caballero, R J (2010) ‘Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of-
Knowledge Syndrome’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4): 85-102. 
Carabelli, A and Cedrini, M A (2014) ‘Chapter 18 of The General Theory “further analysed”: 
economics as a way of thinking’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 38 (1): 23–47. 
Cartwright, N (1999) The Dappled World: a study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dow, S C (2015) ‘The Role of Belief in the Case for Austerity Policies’, Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 26 (March): 29-42. 
Drakopoulos, S C (2016) ‘Economic crisis, economic methodology and the scientific ideal of 
physics’, Journal of Philosophical Economics 10(1): 28-57. 
Earle, J, Moran, C and Ward-Perkins, Z (2016) The Econocracy: the perils of leaving economics to 
the experts. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Fourcade, M, Ollion, E and Algan, Y (2015) ‘The Superiority of Economists’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 29(1):  89–114. 
Friedman, M (1953) ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, in Essays in Positive Economics. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 3-43. 
Gove, M (2016) Sky News interview, 2 June https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA 
Greenspan, A (2009) ‘We need a better cushion against risk’, Financial Times, March 27. 
Haldane, A G (2016) ‘Whose Recovery’, speech Port Talbot, 30 June. 
Keynes, J M (1924) ‘Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924’, Economic Journal 34(135): 311-72. 
9 
 
Kregel, J (2014) ‘Minsky and Dynamic Macroprudential Regulation’, Levy Institute Public 
Policy Brief no. 131, April. 
Lawson, T (2009) ‘The current economic crisis: its nature and the course of academic economics’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 33(4): 759–77. 
Mankiw, R G and Taylor, M P (2006) Economics. London: Thomson. 
Marcuzzo, M C (2010) ‘Reason and Reasonableness in Keynes’, in A Arnon and W Young, eds, 
Perspectives on Keynesian Economics. Berlin: Springer, pp. 35-55. 
Minsky, H P (1982) Inflation, Recession and Economic Policy. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
Minsky, H P (1986) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Morgan, J (2017) ‘Brexit: Be careful what you wish for?’, Globalizations 14(1): 118 –26. 
O’Donnell, R (1997) ‘Keynes and formalism’, in G C Harcourt and P Riach (eds), A ‘second 
edition’ of The General Theory, vol. 2, pp. 131-65. 
Pühringer, S (forthcoming) ‘The “eternal character” of austerity measures in European crisis 
policies’, in Kate Power, Tanweer Ali & Eva Lebdušková (eds), Discourses of Austerity: 
economists and linguists in an interdisciplinary critical analysis. London: Routledge. 
Runde, J (1998) ‘Assessing Causal Economic Explanations’, Oxford Economic Papers 50(2): 151-
72. 
Sapienza, P and Zingales, L (2013) ‘Economic Experts versus Average Americans’, American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 103(3): 636-42. 
Skapinker, M (2016) ‘Make 2017 the year we fight back against the tide of untruth’, Financial 
Times, 14 December. 
Smith, A ([1759]; 1976) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Glasgow edition, edited by D D Raphael 
and A Macfie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, A ([1762-63] 1978) Lectures on Jurisprudence, edited by R L Meek, D D Raphael and P 
Stein. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, A. ([1776] 1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited 
by R H Campbell and A S Skinner, textual editor W B Todd. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
